)]}'
{
  "commit": "8bfbb744421218b7bb0dd6fabfc5eecd05a11d19",
  "tree": "ec7b66a47c1c499cee5e8b16c16c1478c36c31fe",
  "parents": [
    "a018953688f1b10bddf91bff8747068f5f4746a4"
  ],
  "author": {
    "name": "Toon Claes",
    "email": "toon@iotcl.com",
    "time": "Fri Oct 30 12:12:50 2026 +0000"
  },
  "committer": {
    "name": "Junio C Hamano",
    "email": "gitster@pobox.com",
    "time": "Mon Nov 02 16:09:58 2026 -0800"
  },
  "message": "Documentation: clarify Git\u0027s security boundary\n\nLike so many other open source projects, the Git project has seen an\never-increasing flood of security reports. Many of those reports\ndescribe valid bugs yet are redirected from the git-security mailing\nlist because they are deemed \"not vulnerabilities\". While some Git\ncontributors seem to have a very concrete idea how to discern between\nbugs that constitute vulnerabilities (and hence must be fixed in secret,\nto keep Git users safe) from bugs that can be fixed in the open, most\nreporters must be quite puzzled because the Git project provides no\nclear document to help define the security boundaries Git tries to\nguarantee.\n\nOf course, there _are_ hints and bits and pieces of documentation: Git\u0027s\nsecurity guidance has accumulated across individual fixes. Some might be\ntempted to describe the boundary as \"before clone\" versus \"after clone\",\nbut history establishes a more precise distinction. e69ac42fcc8 (docs:\ndocument security issues around untrusted .git dirs, 2024-04-16)\nexplains why cloned content can generally be inspected with `git log`:\nrepository-local hooks and configuration are not copied, whereas an\nuntrusted `.git` directory remains unsafe. 779ea9303a7 (Documentation:\ndefine protected configuration, 2022-07-14) likewise ties trust to\nconfiguration scope rather than timing alone.\n\nState the governing principle in one place: Git\u0027s security boundary\nconcerns unexpected or implicit execution of attacker-controlled code. A\ntheoretical opportunity to inspect repository contents is not consent to\nexecute them. Conversely, explicitly choosing an execution-capable\nmechanism is materially different. Execution after clone is therefore\nnot inherently a vulnerability.\n\nThis distinction underlies 4cd1cf31efe (Git 2.20.2, 2019-12-04), which\ndescribes CVE-2019-19604 as code running during recursive clone plus a\nsubmodule update \"without the user explicitly having asked for that\".\na1d4f67c12ac (transport: make protocol.file.allow be user by default,\n2022-07-29) likewise contrasts direct user action with recursion lacking\nuser input. e4930e86c0d (t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to\nan RCE, 2024-03-24) similarly frames remote code execution as code run\nby an operation not expected to run it.\n\nTiming remains relevant when it removes any meaningful choice.\n873a466ea3f (clone: drop the protections where hooks aren\u0027t run,\n2024-05-20) notes that clone-time hook execution leaves no chance to\ninspect first. Conversely, 8d1a7448206 (setup.c: create\nsafe.bareRepository, 2022-07-14) addresses post-clone use of embedded\nbare repositories. Together these cases show why timing alone cannot\ndefine the boundary.\n\nAssisted-by: GPT-5.6 Sol\nHelped-by: Patrick Steinhardt \u003cps@pks.im\u003e\nHelped-by: Junio C Hamano \u003cgitster@pobox.com\u003e\nCo-authored-by: Johannes Schindelin \u003cjohannes.schindelin@gmx.de\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Toon Claes \u003ctoon@iotcl.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Johannes Schindelin \u003cjohannes.schindelin@gmx.de\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Junio C Hamano \u003cgitster@pobox.com\u003e\n",
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