Documentation/technical/connectivity-check.adoc

Connectivity checking
=====================

After receiving new objects via fetch, push (receive-pack), clone,
or bundle, Git verifies that the new reference tips do not leave
the repository in a state where reachable objects are missing.
This verification is called the connectivity check.

Connectivity invariant
----------------------

A repository is connected when every object reachable from its
references is available locally (with exceptions noted below).
The reverse does not hold: objects that exist in the object
database but are not reachable from any reference may be
incomplete or lack a connected closure.

The connectivity check maintains this invariant when references
are updated.  It trusts that all objects reachable from existing
reference tips are already fully connected and verifies that the
new reference tips do not introduce references to unavailable
objects.  Verification is permitted to stop when it reaches
objects already reachable from existing references, since their
closure is already connected.  These trusted references include
local references and references from alternate object stores.

Without this check, a truncated or corrupted transfer could leave
a repository in a state where later history walks encounter
missing objects.

Exceptions
~~~~~~~~~~

Gitlink entries (submodule references) are excluded from
connectivity checking.  Their target objects belong to a separate
repository.

In partial clones, objects promised by a promisor remote are
accepted as connected without requiring local existence.  The
check excludes promisor objects from traversal so that it does
not trigger on-demand fetches for them.

Full connectivity check
-----------------------

The full connectivity check runs a `rev-list` subprocess, feeding
the new reference tips via stdin.  A normal invocation is roughly:

    git rev-list --objects --stdin --not --all --quiet
        --alternate-refs [--exclude-promisor-objects]

In a partial clone, objects received from a promisor remote do
not need to be checked: anything they reference is promised by
that remote and can be fetched on demand.  So if every new tip is
found in a promisor packfile, `rev-list` is not run at all.
Otherwise it runs with `--exclude-promisor-objects`, so that the
traversal stops at promisor objects instead of fetching them.

Consider the following graph after a fetch, where all reference
tips point directly to commits.  For simplicity, only local
references appear on the already-connected side; alternate refs
play the same role.  N3 is a merge commit:

            /-------------L2
           /
    C1---B1---C2---B2-----L1
          \         \
           N1        N3---T2
            \       /
             N2-----------T1

    L1, L2:         local refs
    T1, T2:         incoming tips (new refs)
    N1, N2, N3:     incoming commits (N3 is a merge)
    B1, B2:         boundary commits (already connected)
    C1, C2:         already connected (but not boundary)

The incoming set is the commits reachable from the incoming
tips but not from the already-connected side.  Boundary commits
are the already-connected commits at the edge of that set.  Here
B1 is an ancestor of B2, which happens when incoming branches
fork at different depths in the existing history.

The `--not --all` arguments establish the trust boundary: the
incoming set is the commits reachable from the new tips but not
from any existing reference.

The traversal then walks the trees of the boundary commits and
marks those objects uninteresting.  Trees of incoming commits
are then walked, stopping at objects already marked as
uninteresting.  The cost of marking boundary trees uninteresting
dominates when the boundary commits have large trees, even when
the incoming changes are small.

Deepening fetches
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

For deepening fetches (where the shallow boundary moves), the
full check omits `--not --all`.  There is no existing-reference
boundary at which the walk can stop.  Instead, traversal follows
the effective shallow boundary supplied for the deepened
repository.  The new content may be below the old shallow
boundary even when the tips themselves have not changed.

Non-commit tips
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

When a new reference points to a non-commit object, such as a
tag, tree, or blob, that object is not part of the commit walk.
These non-commit tips are verified during the tree and blob
traversal that follows the commit walk within the same rev-list
invocation.

Incremental connectivity check
------------------------------

The incremental mode, selected by
`transfer.connectivityCheck=incremental`, avoids traversing the
full tree walk of the boundary commits.  Instead, it verifies
each incoming commit's tree against the already-trusted trees of
its parent commits.

The same `--not --all` boundary as the full check identifies the
incoming commits.  The incremental mode reuses this boundary but
replaces what happens afterwards: rather than walking boundary
trees to mark objects uninteresting, it compares each incoming
commit's tree against its parents' trees, processing commits in
topological order (ancestors first).  This all happens inside
the same `rev-list` invocation, and the promisor fast path above
still runs first.

Trust model
~~~~~~~~~~~

A tree is trusted when its transitive object closure is known to
be connected.

Every parent of an incoming commit is either on the
already-connected side of the `--not --all` boundary (a boundary
parent whose tree is trusted by definition) or is an earlier
incoming commit that was already verified due to the topological
processing order.  In both cases the parent's tree is trusted, so
all parent trees can be unconditionally used as comparison bases.

Once an incoming commit's tree has been verified, it is trusted
and can serve as a comparison base for later descendants.  This
gives an inductive correctness argument: the base case is the
trust boundary established by `--not --all`, and the inductive
step is that verifying a commit extends the trusted set.

Tree states
~~~~~~~~~~~

The verifier tracks tree OIDs in three states:

untrusted::
	The tree has not yet been established as connected.  This
	is the implicit state of an OID not present in the state
	map.

trusted::
	The tree is known to have a connected transitive closure,
	but its direct entries have not yet been published into the
	verifier's trusted object sets.

expanded::
	The tree is trusted and its direct non-gitlink entries
	have also been published into the trusted object sets.

State transitions are monotonic: a tree may move from untrusted
to trusted to expanded, but never backwards.  An untrusted tree
that is successfully verified goes directly to expanded.

Blobs require only trusted/untrusted state: a blob becomes
trusted when it is found in a trusted tree or when its existence
and type have been verified directly.

The trusted/expanded distinction is an optimization.  An expanded
parent does not need to be reread merely to publish entries that
are already trusted, though it may still be read when same-path
subtree bases are needed for recursive comparison.

Algorithm
~~~~~~~~~

At a high level:

    verify(commits):
        sort topologically (ancestors first)
        for each commit:
            mark parent root trees as trusted
            verify_tree(commit.tree, parent root trees)

    verify_tree(tree, base_trees):
        if tree already trusted: return
        read tree, collect entries not already trusted
        for each available base tree:
            publish its entries as trusted
            record same-path subtrees as bases
        for each collected entry:
            if now trusted: skip
            if blob: verify blob connectivity and type
            if tree: verify_tree(entry, its recorded bases)
        mark tree as expanded

The important ordering within `verify_tree` is that entries from
the new tree are collected before the base trees are scanned, but
are processed only afterwards.  Trust learned from any base can
therefore eliminate work before recursive verification begins.

Same-path parent subtrees are passed down as comparison bases
during recursive descent.  If no comparison base is available,
the new subtree is verified from scratch.

Example
~~~~~~~

Consider a commit that changes one file under `lib/` and moves an
unchanged subtree from `src/` to `dev/`:

    Parent tree              New tree
    +-- src/   (aaa)         +-- dev/   (aaa)
    +-- lib/   (bbb)         +-- lib/   (ccc)
         +-- foo.c (ddd)          +-- foo.c (ddd)
         +-- bar.c (eee)          +-- bar.c (fff)

Scanning the parent makes `aaa` trusted even though it moved from
`src/` to `dev/`, so that subtree is skipped.  The changed `ccc`
subtree is compared against its same-path parent `bbb`; scanning
`bbb` makes `ddd` and `eee` trusted, leaving only the new `fff`
blob to be checked.

This illustrates two properties:

* Trust is OID-based rather than path-based.  An unchanged subtree
  is recognized after a move.

* Same-path parent subtrees provide recursive comparison bases.
  These bases improve pruning efficiency but are not required for
  correctness; a new subtree can always be verified from scratch.

Multiple parents
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

For a merge commit, root trees from all parents are comparison
bases.  When several parents contain a same-path subtree, each
matching subtree is collected as a recursive comparison base.

Entries published from any trusted parent become globally trusted,
so a matching tree or blob entry present in any parent can be
skipped while verifying the merge tree.

Missing comparison bases
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

A promised base tree may not be locally available for comparison.
In that case the verifier skips that base and verifies the new
subtree without it.  The missing comparison can reduce pruning but
does not affect correctness.